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An exemplary thinker and a pivotal figure in the broader philosophical conversa-
tion of the so- called Age of Dialogue, Śāntarakṣita (c.725– 788) provides an encyclo-
pedic guide to the dominant Buddhist and Brahmanical currents of thought of his 
time. First associated with the great University of Nālandā, Śāntarakṣita would even-
tually journey to Tibet, at the invitation of King Khri srong lde btsan, to establish the 
first monastic university, Samye, and serve as its abbot. Well known for his synthesis 
of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka thought, Śāntarakṣita fuses together Nāgārjuna’s (fl. 
150) anti- essentialism, and his notion that all phenomena lack inherent existence and
are thus empty (śūnya), with Yogācāra phenomenology, and its stance on the inelim-
inability of consciousness from any account of ultimate reality. What is remarkable is
that he accomplishes this task largely by adopting the epistemological tools of Dignāga
(c.480– c.540) and Dharmakīrti (550– 610/ 600– 660), two thinkers closely affiliated with
Yogācāra, without sharing their commitment to the irreducibility of the conventional
account of mental properties.
The notion that mind and world arise in dependence upon a multitude of causes and 
conditions is central to Buddhist metaphysics and philosophy of mind, and much of 
Śāntarakṣita’s syncretic project is conceived as a defense of this view. The manifesta-
tion of both mental and physical phenomena is thus grounded in an overarching causal 
principle: dependent arising (pratītyasamutpāda). Conceived largely as an alternative 
to causal models that rely on the concept of potentiality, the principle of “dependent 
arising” depicts causation as nothing but an incessant flow or succession of events. With 
regard to entities defined primarily in terms of their capacity for agency and conscious 
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awareness, dependent arising underscores a dynamic picture of consciousness and cog-
nition: each moment of awareness is thus part of a recursive, object- oriented, but also 
self- revealing causal stream. For the Buddhist, just as it is the case for the Pre- Socratic 
philosopher Heraclitus, the world is in perpetual fl ux; and, to draw another 
Western comparison, like Husserl, the Buddhist regards the phenomenal world 
(MPLBTBṃK×ʨ) as an intentionally constituted stream of lived- experiential events.
Concern with finding an adequate causal explanation of phenomena is 
fundamental to Abhidharma, that system of thought and method of descriptive 
analysis that makes up one of the three collections of Buddhist canonical literature 
(the other two are the sūtra, or discourses of the Buddha, and the vinaya, or the 
monastic rules of conduct). It is also at the core of Śāntarakṣita’s syncretic project, 
which synthesizes a millennium of Buddhist thought in India by integrating 
Abhidharma thought, specifically as pre-sented through the lens of Vasubandhu’s 
(c.400– 480) Sautrāntika perspective, within his Yogācāra-Madhyamaka system.
By advancing a conception of causation that includes consciousness and cognition 
as causally efficient categories, Abhidharma presents us with a metaphysics of expe-
rience: the irreducible elements of existence and/ or experience (dharmas) are not 
essences or substances, but activities, properties, and patterns of connectedness. But 
the project of identifying and mapping out these irreducible elements (e.g., sensations, 
voli-tions, magnitudes, arrays) may also be viewed as a naturalistic phenomenology. 
Indeed, given a notion of conscious cognition as pragmatically efficacious— a 
necessary consid-eration given assumptions about the efficacy of the Eightfold Noble 
Path, which forms the cornerstone of the Buddhism project— there are specific 
questions about the ways in which consciousness is also constitutive of the world of 
phenomena. It is largely in response to questions about the descriptive and 
epistemic features of consciousness that Śāntarakṣita conceives of his defense of the 
irreducibility of consciousness against the charge of physicalism, specifically as 
articulated by the Indian materialists, the Cārvākas.
The Indian materialists (also known by the more common Sanskrit term Lokāyata) 
occupy a unique position in the Indian philosophical tradition as the only 
philosophers to reject such cardinal notions as karmic retribution, rebirth, and 
liberation. Tracing their origins to the classical world, the Cārvākas do not cohere into 
a distinct school of thought until the eighth century ce— the date of their earliest 
recorded text, the Aphorisms of Bṛhaspati (a.k.a., Cārvāka-sūtra). Articulating a 
thoroughly material-ist conception of reality, with the four great elements (earth, 
water, fire, and air) as the only things that exist, the Cārvākas are also known for 
denying the reality of atoms and space on account of their imperceptibility, limiting 
all causality to material causality, and treating consciousness as an emergent property 
of elemental combination in a man-ner similar to the intoxicating power of fermented 
grains.
The key issue in the dispute between Śāntarakṣita and the Cārvākas concerns the 
relation between cognition and the body, and the role this relation plays in causal- 
explanatory accounts of consciousness and cognition. Here a number of questions arise. 
Does the central principle of reductionism apply to consciousness? Is there a causal 
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criterion for the presence of consciousness? If there is, can this causal criterion account 
for the specific features of consciousness, for example, its intentionality, phenomenality, 
and reflexive character (svasaṃvedana)? In other words: can a causal account of phe-
nomena be reconciled with the seeming irreducibility of consciousness? Śāntarakṣita’s 
answer to the challenge of Cārvāka physicalism, which he meticulously articulates in 
his masterful encyclopedic work, the Compendium of Realities (Tattvasaṃgraha),1 dis-
plays many of the common features of classical Indian metaphysical debates on personal 
identity. The analysis that follows shows how arguments against reductive physicalism 
can benefit from an understanding of the structure of phenomenal consciousness that 
does not eschew causal- explanatory reasoning.
Causation, Emergence, and the Mind
What does the notion that mind and world are part of a complex causal nexus mean for a 
conception of the kinds of things that can enter into causal relationships? And what kind 
of causal relationships can obtain between ontologically distinct domains? The canonical 
literature presents us with a standard formula for the dependently arising phenomenon 
of consciousness: “Dependent on the eye and forms, visual- consciousness arises. The 
meeting of the three is contact. With contact as condition there is feeling. What one feels, 
that one perceives. What one perceives, that one thinks about. What one thinks about, 
that one mentally proliferates.”2 The principle of dependent arising, at least in this origi-
nal formulation, does not specify how the causal relation works. Phenomena are grouped 
together depending either on whether they are in tight proximity of each other or on how 
clearly they display patterns of regularity. Common examples include breath and the liv-
ing body, fire and smoke, and the tripartite relations that obtain between kinds of aware-
ness (visual, auditory, introspective, etc.), their corresponding objects (visibles, sounds, 
thoughts, etc.), and their psychological basis (e.g., vision, hearing, thought, etc.). As for 
the constitutive components of mind and matter, these can be regarded as either mutu-
ally entailing or as emergent features of a more fundamental causal domain, the ultimate 
nature of which admits of neither exclusively phenomenal nor physical description.
The first option— mutual entailment— reflects the ontological position of one of 
the main Abhidharma schools, the Sarvāstivāda.3 Here the claim is that there are two 
kinds of existents: primary, such as partless atoms and partless phenomenal primitives 
that constitute the psychophysical domain, and secondary, specifically the compos-
ite entities (or J. L. Austin’s “middle size dry goods”) that populate our mundane exis-
tence. The primary existents comprise the building blocks of material form or rūpa, 
the first of the five irreducible bundles (skandhas), as well as the irreducible elements 
of the phenomenal domain, which together constitute the remaining four bundles of 
the psychophysical domain. The secondary existents are secondary because they can be 
dissolved or made to “disappear under analysis,”4 unlike primary existents, which are 
further irreducible. The chariot can be reduced to its component parts (wheels, felly, 
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axle, etc.), and these in turn can be reduced to their atomic totality, but the atoms them-
selves are impartite and thus further irreducible. Likewise, each experiential moment, 
which non- Buddhist philosophers mistakenly identify with the self, can be reduced to 
the categories of “sensation” (vedanā), “perception” (saṃjñā), “volition” (saṃskāra), or 
“consciousness” (vijñāna).
The second account— emergentism— finds its best articulation among the Indian 
physicalists, the Cārvākas, although it also informs the conception of personal iden-
tity of one particular school of thought self- identified as Buddhist Personalism 
(Pudgalavāda).5 Emergentism postulates that a system of sufficient organizational 
complexity has emergent causal powers that its components, taken individually, do 
not possess.6 In the language of Abhidharma reductionism, secondary existents, while 
reducible to their more basic constitutive elements, nonetheless have emergent causal 
powers that neither element in isolation can manifest: the chariot, when assembled and 
fastened to a horse, has locomotion (a property not available to any of its constitutive 
components taken in isolation). Likewise persons, which supervene on the aggregates, 
but are neither identical to nor different from them, have agency, a property that, at least 
according to the Pudgalavāda, does not belong to either of the constitutive elements of 
personhood. Emergentism is thus the view that at different levels of organization the 
same constitutive elements can display novel properties, properties that reflect not the 
intrinsic natures of the elements themselves but their causal powers.
Physicalism and Its Discontents
Śāntarakṣita opens chapter twenty- two of his Compendium of Realities, aptly titled the 
“Examination of Physicalism,” with a summary of the Cārvāka position on conscious-
ness and causality (vv. 1856– 1870), which serves as a point of departure for his criticism:
If there is no entity that has continuity of existence, then there can be no other world, 
because there is none belonging to the other world. The body, cognition, the sense 
faculties, and the rest being destroyed every moment, they do not endure in another 
world. There is nothing else that is admitted (by you, Buddhists). Hence, conscious-
ness must be regarded as produced from and/ or manifested by, certain material sub-
stances, just like intoxicants, the constituent elements of fermented grains and such. 
The names, “body,” “sense- faculty,” and so on apply to special combinations of earth 
and other material substances; there is nothing besides these. There can be no rela-
tion of cause and effect between the two streams of consciousness under dispute, 
because they subsist in different bodies, just like the cognition of the cow and that of 
the horse … It follows that consciousness proceeds, indeed, from the body which 
displays the activities of breathing in and out, and the rest of the five life- breaths, as 
it is said by Kambalāśvatara. It is sheer audacity to posit the existence of cognitive 
awareness in the foetus, etc., since no object is apprehended (at this stage of develop-
ment), as the sense- faculties are yet to emerge.
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Consciousness can have no other form than the apprehension of objects. It is for 
this reason that cognitive awareness is absent in someone who has fainted … There 
being no soul that may be the support of consciousness, the body is the only support 
for it. So, at the end, when the body has ceased to exist, what will support cogni-
tion? … Furthermore, how could different minds, be related to the same stream of 
consciousness— insofar as those minds are no different than those of an elephant, a 
horse, and other animals? For reasons concerning the basis for cognitive awareness, 
you (sc. Buddhists) either have to commit to the notion of a beginningless conscious-
ness or accept physicalism.7
It is obvious from this outline that the Cārvākas, much like some contemporary physi-
calists,8 do not merely advance a new theory of causation. Rather, they put forward an aus-
tere ontological picture according to which every phenomenon reduces to the four basic 
material elements— earth, water, fire, and air— which alone are ultimately real. Emergent 
phenomena, like the fully formed body and discerning cognition, supervene on these basic 
elements as their functional properties. What the Cārvāka physicalists take issue with is 
the notion that consciousness originates outside the order of the causal domain, perhaps in 
a previous instance of cognitive awareness associated with a different body (as demanded 
by the view of karmic rebirth).9 But the causal closure of the physical domain at work in 
Cārvāka metaphysics does not preclude an event- causal explanation of consciousness 
itself. Indeed, the supervenience argument against the autonomy of cognition is meant to 
refute the existence of a distinct metaphysical realm of mental phenomena, not the efficacy 
of mental processes. On this emergentist picture, cognition is a graded phenomenon that 
tracks closely the development of the body: the absence of sensory organs in the embryonic 
stage, according to Cārvāka, precludes the attribution of any sort of perceptual awareness at 
that level of development. Nor can consciousness be present for a person in a state of coma.
For the Cārvāka, thus, consciousness is not merely a latent phenomenon, which 
becomes manifest as the body develops, but an expression of the body’s functional orga-
nization and responsiveness to a world of objects, situations, and things. Just like fer-
mented grain yields a liquid with the capacity to intoxicate, so also consciousness must 
be regarded as nothing more than a product of the type of material organization that is 
constitutive of biological organisms. Indeed, the Cārvāka offers a rather stark picture of 
the human condition, as we see in one their earliest accounts:
We shall now examine the principles of reality. Earth, water, fire, and air are the principles 
(of reality), nothing else. Their combination is called the “body”, “senses”, and “objects”.
Consciousness [arises] out of these [elements], as the power to intoxicate [arises] 
out of fermenting ingredients. The human being is [nothing but] the body endowed 
with consciousness. [Cognition arises] from the body itself, because of the presence 
[of consciousness] when there is a body.10
If consciousness is nothing but an emergent property of the body, then consciousness 
can be present neither without a faculty of apprehension, nor in the absence of suitable 
objects of apprehension. For the Cārvāka, then, seeking to circumvent these objections, 
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as the Buddhist does, by pointing to the momentary nature of the constitutive mate-
rial elements further undermines the “continuity of consciousness” picture. The reason, 
claims the Cārvāka, lies with the idea of momentariness itself, which entails the serial 
dissolution of both the object and its apprehensibility.11
It is interesting to note that the Abhidharma mereological reductionism invoked on 
behalf of the Cārvāka to bolster an argument against the autonomy of cognition works 
against both the existence of spatially extended objects and the epistemic reliability of 
cognitions that purport to establish the existence of such objects. It does not work, how-
ever, against cognition having a distinctive phenomenal character and epistemic status. 
For even assuming the Cārvāka view is correct, and only the four elements are real, the 
perception of objects as possessing various properties (motion, change, etc.), argues the 
Buddhist, cannot simply reflect the fundamental order of the causal domain. It is for this 
reason, then, that Śāntarakṣita’s (and his disciple, Kamalaśīla’s) critique of physicalism 
centers not on whether consciousness is amenable to causal explanation, but on whether 
an analysis of the structural features of the phenomenal domain mitigates a conception 
of consciousness as irreducibly qualitative, intentional, and first- personal.12 Indeed, 
the physicalist must contend with the fact that grounding consciousness in the body 
not only raises important questions about the nature of the dependency relation, but 
also confronts well- known mereological issues. Assuming the arising of consciousness 
results from a change in the body, and taking the body to just be the four material ele-
ments so configured, as an emergent property of the body consciousness would violate 
the body’s physical identity. That is, the properties predicated of a body (extension, vol-
ume, weight, motion, etc.) must be so predicated from the start. Even assuming the body 
supervenes on the four elements, it is still the case that as a whole, the body’s emergent 
properties reflect the nature of the domain to which the elements belong. The Cārvāka, 
thus, is no better off at answering the causal question by replacing considerations about 
physical constitution with mereological considerations.
If the body is taken to be the cause of consciousness, as the Cārvāka claims, the ques-
tion naturally arises: is it “cause” in the form of an aggregated whole, as a composite 
of various elements, or as an aggregate of atoms? And, given the requirement that the 
sensory systems are fully developed, does the body serve as a cause along with, or inde-
pendently of, the senses? Finally, should the body (with its physical and functional 
properties) be regarded as a material cause or simply as a condition for the possibility of 
consciousness? Śāntarakṣita’s critique of physicalism is in large measure conceived as a 
series of answers to these pressing questions.
Reasons, Causes, and the Principle 
of Invariable Concomitance
Regardless of doctrinal considerations, Śāntarakṣita’s (and Kamalaśīla’s) arguments 
against the Cārvāka version of reductive physicalism offer an ingenious way of 
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conceptualizing the mind- body problem. In response to a largely emergentist 
picture, they offer a conception of mind and body as part of a complex causal chain 
of dependently arisen phenomena, complex enough, that is, to allow for both the 
multiple realizability of cognition, and for dissociating causes from other 
contributing factors. ɭʆntarak ita’s commitment to the ontological difference 
between “cause” (LʨSBṇB) and “condition” or “conditioning factor” (QSBUZBZB) plays 
an integral role in his critical assessment of the nature of causality: insofar as 
something is deemed a cause it can only give rise to a specific type of effect. 
Conditions, on the other hand, can serve as a basis for the arising of multiple effects. 
A bulbil can only bloom into a specific type of water lily, but the same body of water 
can support any variety of water plants.
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and sound, there is auditory consciousness. In the case of introspective awareness, it is 
the constitutive elements of the mental domain (thoughts and desires) themselves that 
provide the causal link. This generative conception of cognition raises a different con-
cern: if an intentional mental state can serve as the basis for the arising of a subsequent 
moment of cognitive awareness, then consciousness is a causa sui and no longer fits the 
explanatory model of dependent arising. So the Buddhist confronts a dilemma again. 
Either consciousness has causal efficacy insofar as it constitutes a linchpin within the 
psychophysical domain or its efficacy is such that it does not admit of causal description. 
How is it, then, that the operations of mind can be realized within the body, but not be 
reducible to its psychological states?
Regardless of the difficulties that causal explanations pose for understanding the 
nature of consciousness, the critique of Cārvāka physicalism advanced by Śāntarakṣita 
is instructive in the way it frames the principle of similar kinds. Simply put, the prin-
ciple states that a causal relation cannot be established between two things, if changes 
in one do not result in changes in the other. For something to count as the effect of a 
cause it must be brought about by changes in the immediately preceding instance in the 
causal chain.15 For phenomenal consciousness to be the effect of a body and its sensory 
organs, its presence must be causally dependent on the latter. However, as Śāntarakṣita 
argues, experience suggests otherwise: loss of hearing, sight, and other kinds of sensory 
and motor impairment do not diminish the self- reflexive character of phenomenal con-
sciousness. So phenomenal consciousness is dependent neither on the body and the 
sensory systems working together, nor on each of them taken individually.16
The examples adduced in support of this view by Śāntarakṣita’s commentator, 
Kamalaśīla, illustrate their distinctly phenomenological approach:  severed limbs are 
inert and defective sense organs lack cognitive function.17 Of course, this phenomeno-
logical orientation does not lack empirical grounding. A well- nourished body, argues 
the Cārvāka, alters the quality of subjective experience in significant ways. True, recog-
nizes Kamalaśīla, but so does the sight of blood for hemophobic individuals.18 Similarly, 
moods show little correlation with the body’s physical strength and stamina. If the body, 
as the Cārvāka claims, is the material cause of consciousness, then a strong, vigorous 
body ought to result in a greater degree of clarity, wisdom, and understanding. The 
opposite, however, is what is observed to be the case: the clarity and stability of a con-
scious feeling, say of love, correlates more strongly with a happy and peaceful mind than 
with a vigorous body. It would be a mistake to call youthful infatuation love, just as it 
would be a mistake to call physical stamina wisdom.19
If strict causal generation is untenable, perhaps a weaker conception of dependence 
could be granted. By invoking the principle of invariable concomitance, the Cārvāka 
presses the criticism further, offering a different example:  just as light is invariably 
concomitant with a light source (such as, for instance, a lamp), so too phenomenal 
consciousness is invariably concomitant with the body. How light depends on and prop-
agates from a light source may not be obvious, but their invariable concomitance is not 
only unmistakable but grounded in the essential nature of things: light sources illumi-
nate. Similarly, argues the Cārvāka, while the exact mode of generation is not apparent, 
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phenomenal consciousness is only observed when the body and its fully developed sen-
sory systems are present.20 The model of generation at work in this case allows for het-
erogeneous causal factors to play a role. In the same way that fire is a cause for metals 
manifesting the property of fluidity, so also the fetus, as the body’s material cause, is the 
contributing cause for the manifestation of consciousness in the infant at birth.21 The 
Cārvāka is willing to grant that, once arisen, phenomenal consciousness may have prop-
erties that explain its subjective and temporal character, hence its diachronic continuity; 
what is untenable from a Cārvāka standpoint is the Buddhist notion that consciousness 
is beginningless.
Does, then, the relation between consciousness and causal explanation point to the 
autonomy of cognition or does it not? Cognitive awareness is obviously in some kind of 
dependency relation to the body, as demanded by the principle of dependent arising. For 
instance, visual awareness can only emerge in organisms that are sensitive to light. The 
Cārvāka does grant that cognitive awareness can have novel properties not observed in 
the material substratum (the body) that serves as its basis. But unlike the dualist picture 
the Buddhist paints, the Cārvāka contends that as an awareness of a certain type (visual, 
auditory, etc.) consciousness must be related to the body’s specific functionality in the 
respective cognitive domain. Given that consciousness takes the form of an apprehen-
sion of objects (that is, given its inherently intentional structure), and given that appre-
hension only occurs in specific modes of cognizing such as perceiving, imagining, or 
remembering, consciousness can be present neither when the sensory systems are not 
yet developed (as in the embryonic stage) nor when they are not responsive (as in a 
state of coma). Is there a causal criterion for the presence of consciousness? And, more 
importantly, can the Buddhist answer the challenge of physicalism without appealing to 
the kind of evidence (e.g., the remembrance of past lives) the Cārvāka would simply not 
accept?
Causality and the Autonomy 
of Cognition
The Buddhist certainly faces a dilemma: the aggregated conception of personal iden-
tity seems to support the physicalist position that consciousness is an emergent prop-
erty of certain types of material organization. Consciousness cannot be both part of this 
causal web and just an instance in a beginningless stream of conscious events. Can the 
Buddhist answer the physicalist challenge while retaining a causal- explanatory frame-
work in accounting for the relation between cognition and the body?
Śāntarakṣita’s response, it seems, signals an important difference between the opera-
tions of causality in the physical domain and the limits models of material causation face 
when extended to consciousness and cognition. Noting the case of dreams, which are 
obvious instances of cognition occurring in the absence of sensory activity, Śāntarakṣita 
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argues for the self- intimating nature of cognitive awareness, specifically its self- reflexive 
character. This dimension of consciousness presumably is not affected by the tempo-
rary loss of a sense of self and one’s surrounding in fainting. The postulation of a non- 
conceptual aspect of consciousness thus allows Śāntarakṣita to frame the question of the 
emergence of consciousness: where the physicalist denies the presence of consciousness 
in the fetus on empirical grounds, the Buddhist posits it as simply a case of minimal con-
scious awareness (vv. 1922– 1926):
What is the basis for asserting the absence of consciousness JO sleep or swoon, and 
other similar states? If it is argued that “Such ascertainment comes from the absence 
of consciousness,” then, we ask: how is such absence (of consciousness) cognized? 
If it is claimed, “no consciousness is cognized in that instance (of sleep oS swoon),” 
then, that is a proof for the existence of consciousness in those states. It may be fur-
ther argued, “If consciousness is present during such states, why is there no recollec-
tion of such states upon awakening?” This reasoning is not an effective refutation 
of our view. It is lack of vividness and other factors that account GoS the non- 
recollection of (consciousness in such states), as is also the case with conscious 
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Does appeal to dreams, infatuation, and mind wandering suffice to make the case 
against the physicalist claim that conscious cognition is an emergent property of the 
body? For an answer to this question we may turn to Kamalaśīla, whose extensive com-
mentary on Śāntarakṣita’s “Examination of Physicalism” supplies much of the concep-
tual material for rethinking the relation between consciousness and causality. If, as the 
Cārvāka claims, consciousness arises from the body (in the same manner in which the 
power of intoxication emerges from fermented grains), then does it arise from the mate-
rial elements alone, from their configuration as bodies, or from their atomic totality? 
Setting aside the question whether causality should be understood in terms of homo-
geneous or heterogeneous causal chains, Kamalaśīla points out the inadequacy of 
strictMZ physical models of causal generation in accounting for mental phenomena:
It could be said, “All the atoms insofar as they occur in [its] proximity are the cause 
of cognition.” In that case a difference should be observable between the effect pro-
duced by a non- deficient cause and that produced by a deficient cause, as the two are 
different. Otherwise, a distinction in the [capacity of the] cause [to bring about dif-
ferent effects depending on its fitness] would be futile.24
The slightest variations in the causal chain are sufficient to cast doubt on a strictMZ 
physi-cal model of causal generation. If a cause, which otherwise may appear perfect 
in the generation of some effect, fails to do so, specifically by not occasioning a 
difference in the mind and that which is mental (mano- mati), then, it cannot be 
counted as such. We see here a clear acknowledgement that cognitive awareness 
depends upon the efficacy of all underlying causal factors (perceptual, volitional, 
dispositional, etc.), and the rec-ognition that, in turn, these factors reduce to their 
causal totality (kāranasāmagrī). On a strict account of causal generation, as the 
examples provided by the Cārvāka suggest, cognitive error would track closely 
deficient causation. But that does not always happen. One might perceive a sparkling 
lake where there is only a naturally occurring optical illusion. This perceptual illusion 
is not simply a case of misapprehension, for the illusion persists even after it has 
been disambiguated (that is, after one has come to apprehend the appearance of the 
lake as a mirage).
Śāntarakṣita’s critique of physicalism, thus, uses an error argument to target what 
in effect is a conception of brute emergence: that is, the notion that any thing may 
pro-duce anything. The persistence of perceptual illusion even aft  er 
disambiguation, and the possibility of effective action such disambiguation opens 
up (that is, not chasing afUer a mirage), works against the strict causal model of the 
physicalist, which reduces human agency to changes in the microphysical structure 
of each individual. When Śāntarakṣita claims that a trustworthy cognition must also 
be pragmatically ef f icatious,25 he advances a different naturalistic account of 
cognition than the one put forth by the Cārvāka, one that takes into account the 
intentional structure of awareness and its phenomenal character. Take the example 
of perception:  t he phenomenal character of perceptual awareness is not 
constrained by the apprehension of the particular as such; rather, the particular is 
only as perceived. This way of framing the character of cognitive awareness 
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allows for the perceiver’s intentional stance to be disclosed. In the case of perceptual illu-
sions such as mirages, it is not only the perceiver’s vantage point but also the phenom-
enal character of the experience itself (illusory water cannot quench thirst) that ensures 
successful action.
Has this Cārvāka’s account of brute emergence been, then, satisfactorily challenged? 
Before we attempt an answer to this question, let us revisit once more Śāntarakṣita’s 
contention that the senses are rendered ineffective by an impaired consciousness. 
Regardless of whether we take him to be arguing from a Sautrāntika or Yogācāra posi-
tion,26 is it clear that even when he appears to reject the notion that the intentional object 
is causally related to the experience of a unique particular, Śāntarakṣita is in fact mak-
ing a statement about the importance of phenomenological considerations (specifically, 
concerning the structure of awareness) in settling epistemological disputes. Indeed, his 
account of the efficacy of cognition hinges on whether conscious experience ultimately 
stands not merely for how things seem, but also for how they are. Clearly, Śāntarakṣita 
here takes the lead of the Buddhist epistemologists Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, who 
defend a reflexivist dual- aspect theory of consciousness. As Dignāga writes in his 
Collection on the Sources of Knowledge (Pramāṇasamuccaya): “Every cognition is pro-
duced with a twofold appearance, namely that of itself (svābhāsa) and that of the object 
(viṣayabhāsa).”27 The objective aspect (grāhyākāra) or object- appearance (viṣayābhāsa) 
captures the intentional aspect of cognition or its object- directedness, while the subjec-
tive aspect stands for cognition’s own self- intimating aspect, which marks it as happen-
ing for someone, as occurring in a given mental stream. Thus, regardless of whether an 
actual object is present or not, cognition arises having this dual aspect.
By adopting this dual- aspect theory of phenomenal consciousness, Śāntarakṣita does 
show commitment to an internalist epistemology. Unlike the physicalist, who operates 
with an externalist epistemology, Śāntarakṣita is committed to the view that cognitions 
do not effectively differ from their sources. Instead of understanding, say, empirical 
awareness in terms of a relation between perception and its object, Śāntarakṣita, much 
like Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, offers us an account of epistemically warranted cogni-
tions as constituted by their content only insofar as this content is produced in the right 
way: that is, by the object as perceived. Incidentally, it is because illusory cognitions are 
not so constituted, rather than any strict causal process, that they lack both pragmatic 
efficacy and explanatory force. This view is motivated, at least in part, by the radical 
and essential separation of direct modes of apprehension (e.g., perception), which take 
the form of the givenness of experience itself, from the inferential processes they thus 
support.
If one does not factor in the dual- aspect theory of mental states in mapping out the 
relation between consciousness and causality, then one cannot understand why causal 
explanation retains an element of ontological subjectivity: whether causation is taken 
to be a necessary relation between events or merely a concept for observed regularities 
between events, it is undeniable that dependency relations are both grounded in, and 
reflective of, specific modes of causal reasoning. Thus, whether one rejects the Cārvāka 
notion that there are strict dependency relations between events, or takes the Buddhist 
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view that dependent arising provides an effective way to accommodate consciousness 
as a factor in the causal chain, a causal explanatory account must be epistemically war-
ranted. The justification, then, for taking reflexivity (svasaṃvedana, svasaṃvitti) as a 
condition for the possibility of warranted cognition may indeed stem from a commit-
ment to the self- luminosity theory of mental states, the theory that the mind has some 
inherently revealing capacity. What is important about this theory, however, is that it 
rules out the possibility of treating human cognition as an involuntary, purely mecha-
nistic, or behavioral process. Walking is a complex motor skill, and once learned may 
appear involuntary. The same can be said about language and basic perceptual function. 
But what ensures their epistemic efficacy is the ongoing active presence of an implicit 
awareness that attends to the object at hand.
The acquisition of practical skills, like any other kind of moral and mental cultiva-
tion, is only possible if cognitive awareness is taken to have a specific kind of structure, 
specifically one that can accommodate the intentional and self- presentational aspects of 
each mind moment. The mind’s attentive capacity (manaskāra), thus, makes a certain 
dimension of human cognition not merely the effect of causal chains in the physical 
domain but a causal factor in its own right in the domain of cognition. This attentive 
or self- aware aspect of cognition can remain constant with respect to a given object of 
experience (say, a column of smoke), despite it being prompted by a deficient cause (in 
this case, a dust column). On account of this apparent variance, consciousness is nei-
ther entirely grounded in, nor explainable in terms of, physical elements and processes. 
The Buddhist does not deny that cognitive states are made manifest (abhivyajyate) when 
the body is present, only that their manifestation is not to be understood in strictly 
physical terms.
These considerations about why causal accounts of generation for material bodies are 
inadequate in explaining how conscious awareness comes to have the properties that it 
does bring us to the final question we asked at the beginning of this essay: Can we rec-
oncile a causal account of phenomena with the seeming irreducibility of consciousness? 
It should in principle be possible to venture a positive answer on behalf of Śāntarakṣita 
if we abandon the notion that aggregation in the physical domain offers the only viable 
conception of causality. In lieu of the conventional translation of upādāna- kāraṇa as 
“material cause,” the more suitable notion of “appropriating” or “acquiring cause” could 
be adopted instead.28 The case could then be made that the elements, in their particular 
dynamic grouping as bodies, “acquire” the emergent property of sentience or aware-
ness only in specific circumstances: that is, only when their combination serves as a 
basis for agency and attentiveness (that is, only when configured as living organisms). 
Kamalaśīla’s gloss on the relationship between cause and effect (kārya- kāraṇa), it seems, 
suggests precisely this reading of causation in the psychophysical domain: something 
that causes emergent properties such as consciousness to become manifest.29
This understanding of the relationship between the autonomy of cognitive awareness 
and material causation differs in important ways from that of the Cārvāka. Not only 
is a minimal sense of non- reflective self- awareness or attentiveness covariant with the 
body and its sensory systems, it also assists in the emergence of cognition in its manifold 
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aspects. The character of cognition, as Śāntarakṣita crucially reminds us, is contrary 
to insentient objects: “Cognitive awareness arises as something that is excluded from 
all insentient objects. This reflexive awareness of that cognition is none other than its 
non- insentience.”30
In articulating this conception of the phenomenal character of cognition, Śāntarakṣita 
simply follows Dharmakīrti’s critique of the physicalist claim that consciousness 
arises from the material elements or from a transformation thereof31 Rather, 
consciousness is merely covariant with, and only with, a specific type of material 
organization typical of sentient organisms.
Conclusion
The “Examination of Physicalism” does not contain Śāntarakṣita’s full account of the 
nature of mind as worked out in his Yogācāra- Madhyamaka synthesis,32 but does serve 
as a focal point for thinking about the relation between consciousness and causality. 
Theories of causation form an integral part of much philosophical speculation in clas-
sical India, because they are motivated by concerns with demonstrating the possibility 
of freedom, which is essential to overcoming the limitations of the human condition. 
Insofar as they eschew such concerns, the Cārvākas also discount the importance of effi-
cient causation, focusing instead on material causes and conditions, as their emergen-
tist account of consciousness demonstrates. In that regard, they both align with, and 
face the same challenges as, modern physicalists. Indeed, from a modern standpoint, it 
may be objected that consciousness is a subjective phenomenon and thus not amenable 
to scientific (hence, efficient causal) explanation. In reducing the analysis of conscious-
ness and cognition to transactions in the physical domain, the Cārvāka, like present- day 
physicalists, is thus committing a category mistake. Perhaps even Śāntarakṣita, insofar as 
he advances the claim that mental events can be accounted for in efficient- causal terms, 
is guilty of the very charge he levels against the physicalist. But ontological reduction-
ism is not the same as epistemological reductionism. The Buddhists may well admit that 
aggregated entities reduce to their ontological primitives, which alone are real. But caus-
ally describable series of events are not incompatible with treating some basic events as 
irreducibly mental, so Buddhist reductionism does not necessarily entail physicalism.
Now, on a distinctly Kantian line of argumentation about the irreducibility of nor-
mative relations (relations that obtain in the logical space of reason), mental events 
that are constitutive of personal identity will not admit of efficient- causal description. 
Against such a normative framework, Śāntarakṣita’s appeal to causal explanation as a 
criterion for the efficacy of epistemic practices would arguably render his account indis-
tinguishable from that of the physicalist.33 The efficacy of reasons lies primarily in the 
relevance of their content rather than the fact that they fall under some efficient- causal 
description. The point of this Kantian take on the Buddhist epistemological project 
is that reasons engage our conceptual capacities in ways that cannot be accounted for 
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in terms of the dynamics of causally efficacious particulars. However, if Śāntarakṣita’s 
causal reductionism allows for material causation to play only an assisting role in medi-
ating cognition, then the epistemological naturalism he proposes as a viable 
alternative to physicalism is less problematic, especially when considered  in light of 
embodied accounts of cognition.34
Śāntarakṣita’s response to the problem of how to think of consciousness using the lan-
guage of efficient- causal explanation is framed by two sorts of considerations: first, about 
the basis or support of consciousness (that is, about what sorts of factors might be respon-
sible for the arising of different aspects of consciousness given a metaphysical commit-
ment to momentariness), and second, about the structure and character of consciousness 
(which reflects a commitment to the reflexivity thesis). Consciousness is thus constitutive 
of a constant and continuous stream of discrete cognitive events, not independently of, but 
rather alongside, various conditioning and dispositional factors. For Śāntarakṣita, thus, 
the problem is not how cognition can arise from purely causal interactions in the psycho-
physical domain. Rather, the problem is how this domain, which also includes irreducible 
phenomenal properties, conditions the arising of specific cognitive events.
If there is one lesson from contemporary philosophy of mind that can prove useful 
in negotiating Śāntarakṣita’s contribution to understanding the relation between con-
sciousness and causality, it concerns a specific case of the so- called fallacy of ambigu-
ity. As John Searle has convincingly argued, “there is a systematic ambiguity in the use 
of the word ‘empirical,’ an ambiguity between an ontological sense and an epistemic 
sense.”35 Sometimes “empirical” stands for contingent states of affairs, and sometimes 
for a method that can be used to establish something as factual. In particular, facts about 
one’s subjective experience are not empirically accessible in the way that facts about the 
external world are. The basis for the epistemic subjective- objective distinction, thus, is an 
ontological distinction in modes of existence. Even for Śāntarakṣita, whose ontological 
perspective with regard to the nature of reality most closely aligns with the Sautrāntika, 
entities like mountains and atoms are experience- independent (even as they are treated 
as conventional designations). On the other hand, there is a class of phenomena that 
are experience- dependent:  pains and pleasures manifest only as phenomenal 
quali-ties of awareness. The experience- dependent status of these qualitative 
TUBUFT, however, does not render them any less real. The pain, whatever its causal 
status with regard to prior events (say, a wound), has a distinctive qualitative aspect. 
Is there a clear boundary between experience- dependent and experience- 
independent phenomena? Even in the prescientific world of first- millennium 
Indian Buddhism one can appeal to specific physical and psychophysical laws to 
negotiate this difference. On the one hand, we are physiologically limited to 
perceiving only a narrow range of light frequen-cies. On the other hand, the 
composition and temperature of fl uid mediums such as air and water cause light to 
bend (heat waves at ground level cause straight lines to appear curved). Not only is 
the analysis of cognitive error central to the Buddhist epistemo-logical project, but 
also accounts of its etiology clearly distinguish between internal and external factors 
in an effort to mark the boundary between experience- dependent and experience- 
independent phenomena.
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The capacity to unambiguously apprehend phenomena not only as they seem, but as 
they presumably are, suggests that we can have an epistemologically objective account 
of subjectivity. In short, ontological subjectivity is no bar to epistemic objectivity. 
Consciousness does not begin when attention is directed to a given object or mental 
state: that is, conscious awareness does not become manifest by being reflected upon 
(which is to say that consciousness has an observer- independent status). On the other 
hand, causality is an observer- relative phenomenon: the very notion of “event” presup-
poses an observer. Events thus stand in a particular kind of relation to their antecedents 
only to the extent that there is a conception of causality in place. That causality should be 
an observer- relative phenomenon does not mean, however, that it is not a real feature of 
our ontology. Rather, its observer- relative status simply suggests that it contains an ele-
ment of ontological subjectivity.
One of the central principles of Buddhist philosophy of mind is that causal expla-
nation contains an element of ontological subjectivity. It is this conception of causal 
explanation that allows Śāntarakṣita to claim that not only cognition, but even such 
apparently involuntary and causally governed phenomena as breathing, are contingent 
on the presence of consciousness.
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